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THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA: THE CASE FOR DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT¹

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Abstract

This paper analyses the emergence of the Armenian Genocide on the international agenda as a political issue. It considers both structural conditions and agency activism on both the state and non-state levels within which the demands for recognition, reparation and reconciliation have been formulated. The primary hypothesis maintains that the emergence of the Armenian Genocide on the international agenda responded first to identity considerations in both the Diaspora and Soviet Armenia, but after Armenia gained independence in 1991 it became a controversial issue as a state policy. Focusing on the evolution of the issue since then, the paper highlights both the ethical and strategic dimensions of the question and the challenge to overcome their contradictions. The aim is to make a case for diplomatic engagement as a state policy complementing the Armenian Diaspora's "Track Two" citizen diplomacy activism.

Introduction: The "Forgotten," or the Political Consequences, of the Singularity of the Armenian Genocide on the International Agenda

The mass extermination of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915-1923, which is now understood to be the first "modern" genocide of the 20th century,² was "forgotten" by the world for nearly fifty years following a self-imposed amnesia of World War I (WWI) Allies. There are five main reasons for this "Great Silence," as coined by the Armenian writer Berj Zeituntsian in one of his plays about the Armenian Genocide: first, Turkish denial as the official policy of the Republic founded by Mustafa Kemal, known as Ataturk; second, the strategic interest of the Allies for Turkish neutrality during World War II (WWII) and for keeping Turkey as a crucial NATO ally in the Cold War for the containment of the Soviet Union; third, the impossibility of the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) of Armenia leading an international process in quest of recognition and reparation because of its lack of sovereignty while the USSR maintained an official policy of "good neighborhood" after the circumstantial Kemalist-Bolshevik cooperation against the Allies in the early 1920s; fourth, the worldwide dispersion and exile conditions of the survivors of the Genocide, who, naturally, faced the urgency of organizing a collective existence; fifth, though during WWI and its immediate aftermath the extermination of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was labeled as a "crime against humanity" and the Young Turks' government held responsible for it, the concept of "genocide" as a legal term was conceived much later, in 1944.

This singular "forgetting" of the Genocide, the conscious ignoring of the fact imposed by Turkey and the silent complicity of the rest of the world, meant the factual disappearance from the international agenda of the Armenian Question as

formulated by the end of the 19th century; this, in fact, was the privately confessed supreme aim of those who planned and executed the crime. But the “forgetting” of the Genocide constituted also the last stage of the crime—the social construction of its non-existence. If it had succeeded, the answer to Hitler’s question, “Who remembers the Armenians?” would have had as its answer: “Nobody;” and the Genocide would have become the paradigm of the perfect crime—the one that never happened. This is why the effort to make the Armenian Genocide an issue on the international agenda is more than the resurrection of the 19th century Armenian Question. In fact, since 1965, this effort has come to serve as a sort of proof of existence and a central piece of collective identity for the Diaspora.

This paper pursues both an explicative and normative aim. First, it analyzes the political process of the inclusion of the Armenian Genocide on the international agenda, and, second, makes a case for the necessity of diplomatic engagement with the issue as a state policy by the Republic of Armenia. I maintain that the Armenian Genocide gained international visibility as a consequence of the Diaspora’s political activism and social mobilization from 1965 on. Nevertheless, the Diaspora, as a non-state actor on the international stage, has faced serious constraints in making the recognition and the reparation of the Genocide an issue on the international agenda. Yet, since 1991, the Armenian State has been reluctant to fully engage with the Genocide as a state policy. The issue was not on the foreign policy agenda of the first government, and when, in 1998, this position was reversed and the inclusion of the Genocide on Armenia’s foreign agenda publicly declared, rarely, or only circumstantially, did the political engagement of the State go beyond rhetoric. The lack of a sustained diplomatic course concerning the Genocide in the international arena as a distinctive feature of Armenia’s active presence in the world is the most obvious proof of the still persistent reluctance for a full engagement with the issue as a State policy. I explain the root causes of this reluctance, and make an argument for the necessity of diplomatic engagement with the issue of Genocide in terms of recognition, reparation, reconciliation and prevention, for three main reasons: national security, foreign policy strategy, and Diaspora-Armenia common collective identity. If institutionalized, a diplomatic engagement with the issue of Genocide would also complement the Diaspora’s activism of “Track Two” citizen diplomacy.

My theoretical perspective is based on the agent-structure problematique of social constructivism to explain the process of the emergence of the issue of genocide on the international agenda as both identity politics and the classical “struggle for power.” Within the context of the agent-structure problematique, I also use some elements of the Marxist approach, especially Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” reformulated within International Relations (IR) Theory, to explain Armenia’s reluctance to fully engage with the issue of Genocide. As for my case for diplomatic engagement, I follow the conceptual framing of the “New Diplomacy” and state-civil society dynamics in the formation of “Coalitions of the Willing.” In my conclusion I reformulate Armenia’s former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian’s concept of “complementarity” in the national context to broaden understanding and practice of it as Armenia’s distinctive foreign policy doctrine.

Section I. Diaspora, Identity Politics, and the Emergence of the Genocide on the International Agenda

The Armenian Question vanished from the international agenda because there was no state to claim it, nor did it respond to the geopolitical interests of the Great Powers after 1923, as in fact it had in the last quarter of the 19th century.³ No such interest emerged during the following decades, and even less so in the context of the Cold War, with Turkey’s inclusion on February 18, 1952 in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the stabilization of the bipolar balance of power on the Turkish-Soviet border. It is, therefore, impossible to explain from a traditional State-centric IR Theoretical perspective how an issue challenging the structure of the balance of power made its way to the international agenda. In fact, the emergence of the Genocide as an international issue is understandable first from an Identity Politics perspective, and then, at a later stage, within agent-structure dynamics.⁴

This section argues that the emergence of the Armenian Genocide on the international agenda is the consequence of the dynamics of Identity Politics in the Armenian Diaspora and Soviet Armenia. As such, it is related more to existential motivations than to strategic calculations or material incentives. The activism of Identity Politics, however, did have an impact on the international structure at the precise moment when the latter was on the verge of a change. The Whittaker Report in the UN Sub-commission of Human Rights in 1985, and the 1987 decision of the European Parliament, along with several other public declarations, parliamentary motions and similar supportive gestures, constitute both the proof of genocide gaining visibility and the constraints of non-state activism to push an issue on the international agenda beyond its formulation as an ethical commitment. These constraints are even more obvious in the case of the national mobilization in Soviet Armenia, which scored hardly any result beyond rescuing the memory of the Genocide and giving to it a visibility in Armenia; for reasons relevant to the Soviet authoritarian regime there was not even a “Sovietization” of the Genocide, or its official treatment, even as a moral issue, in Moscow.

I.a. The Critical Juncture: 1965

The 50th anniversary of the Genocide became a critical moment for Armenians in the Diaspora and Soviet Armenia, as the commemoration of the Genocide became a popular mobilization demanding justice. An agreement between the three historical political parties, the Social-Democratic Hunchaguian Party (SDHP, Hunchag), the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, Dashnagtsutjun), and the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADLP, Ramgavar), in the Diaspora provided the ground for massive rallies in almost all Armenian communities in the world, claiming recognition and reparation for the Genocide. In Soviet Armenia, for the first time since 1920, the silent commemoration of the anniversary of the Genocide led to a popular outburst with the provocative cry of “Our lands! Our lands!” referring to Western Armenia. For almost three days the government lost control of the situation and risked a military intervention from Moscow had order not been restored by then.⁵

Hence to both the Diaspora and Soviet Armenia, the 50th anniversary of the Genocide was a critical juncture with the revival of the Armenian Cause for the forthcoming years. Understandably, only in the Diaspora was the struggle politicized in terms of public demands, and, ultimately, use of violence. The critical juncture of 1965 was the consequence of the conjunction of three factors: the coming of age of a third generation of Armenians since the Genocide in the Diaspora, the persistence of the silence about the crime, and the international context. Indeed, the new generation of Armenians born in the Diaspora, which came of age in the late 1960s and during the 1970s, was the generation of the grandchildren of the survivors of the Genocide. The third generation did not face the survival problem of their grandparents, nor did they have the urgent need for success in business as a way of integrating in their new milieu as did their parents, the generation of the 1940s and the aftermath of WWII. Moreover, the third generation of Diaspora Armenians was the generation that grew up in ghetto-style community institutions, foreseen by their parents as the way of preserving the national identity while waiting for the day of redemption—the massive return to the Fatherland.

At the same time, the third generation is also the generation of Armenians who received higher education and started to wander outside the community. They were in touch and politically engaged with the world much more than the generation of their fathers, who usually defined engagement as the struggle for the preservation of a national identity. It is precisely this contact with the world that drove the third generation of Armenians to question the persistent international silence about the Genocide in a world that had condemned the Holocaust in Nuremberg and adopted the UN Genocide Convention in 1948. Preserving the national culture, identity and memory through passivity in politics did not convince them anymore, as they witnessed how the very element conditioning the perpetuation of the national identity, the Armenian language, was already vanishing from everyday use.

The third generation, finally, grew up with the open protests against the war in Vietnam, the French student demonstrations of May '68, and, above all, the efforts for Palestinian emancipation after the Six Day War of 1967. The international context of the late 1960s and the 1970s, of the Détente and the emergence of Third World politics, thus, motivated the third generation of Armenians to start a new phase of politicization culminating in direct action.⁶ It is worth observing that it was in 1965 that, for the first time since the Genocide, April 24 was declared by law as a "Day for the Remembrance of the Armenian Martyrs,"⁷ and the Committee for the Defense of the Armenian Cause (CDCA in its French acronym) was created in Paris.

I.b. Mass Mobilization, Direct Action, and Political Advocacy: The Successive Stages of Diasporan Activism

Diasporan activism went through three stages during the two decades that followed the 50th anniversary of the Genocide.⁸ It started, as described above, with massive mobilizations in the streets, instead of closed ceremonies in churches and community centers, and reached out to mass media and international

organizations.⁹ It is not incorrect to presume that Armenian expectations of states, international organizations and especially the UN were naively high at the first stage of Diasporan activism, partly as a consequence of a lack of understanding of the logic of international politics. Soon, however, disappointment followed, as these efforts did not produce any tangible result. Moreover, Turkey moved to an active stage in its politics of denial when, in 1973, its representative asked and obtained the removal of even a slight mention of the Armenian Genocide in the 30th paragraph of the report of the UN Sub-commission for Human Rights, to erase perhaps the last, and almost insignificant, trace of memory of the crime.¹⁰ The Turkish move, according to Gérard Chaliand, constituted a shock for Armenians worldwide, who received the news as the denial of their very existence.¹¹

The Turkish move came in the year when Turkey's General Consul in Los Angeles and his Secretary were assassinated in Santa Barbara, California. The author of this assassination, Kurken Yanikian, a Genocide survivor, gave himself up to the US authorities, and in court declared no remorse whatever for an act he characterized as revenge for the killing of all the members of his family during the Genocide. Condemned to prison for life, Yanikian became almost a living model for many young Diaspora Armenians.¹² Yanikian was released from prison for his advanced age in 1981, when the impact of his act as both a stimulus for internal revival and a means for carrying out the struggle was already observable. Indeed, between 1975 and 1985, an estimated 222 violent actions were perpetrated against targets related to the Turkish State or Turkish interests in approximately twenty Western and non-Western countries, including the former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, both at that time under a socialist regime. The RAND Corporation characterized the geographical scope of these actions as the broadest of its time, not equaled by any other group.¹³ According to an early observer of what the Armenian press called "armed propaganda," and more commonly was labeled "Armenian terrorism," some twenty organizations released public statements either claiming responsibility for an action, or to announce their formation, aim, and course of action. Two groups stand out as the leading organizations that generated the phenomenon: The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). The latter had a national orientation, limiting the scope of its actions to the Turkish State, whereas the ASALA defined the struggle in the broader context of anti-imperialism and occasionally targeted both Turkish non-state objectives, including civilians, and Western interests. A third organization, the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), closer to the ideological position of the JCAG, became widely known after five of its members occupied the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, on July 27, 1983, and blew themselves up during the operation. The last important action of Armenian "terrorism" was the occupation of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, on March 14, 1985 by three members of the ARA, who ended by giving themselves up to the Canadian government. After the Ottawa operation, the phenomenon of Armenian "terrorism" came to an end, though some of the organizations continued releasing public statements, concluding, thus, the second stage of Diaspora's political activism, direct action.

The legacy of Armenian direct action is a matter of debate, but there is no doubt about its importance in breaking the silence around the Genocide and making it visible on the international stage. The visibility of the Genocide, on the other hand, imposed further professionalization of the Diaspora's political advocacy, which forms the third and current stage of Diaspora politics. It is characterized by the institutionalization of political activity, the formation of entities specialized in the study and promotion of the subject, and the emergence of an epistemic community of historians, sociologists, legal experts, philosophers, politicians, and international analysts, as well as writers, artists and, in general, intellectuals with an expertise in the field. Speaking strictly from a chronological perspective, this third stage does not necessarily follow the end of the decade of direct action. In fact, most of the examples mentioned date back to the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, the characterization of this stage of the evolution of Diasporan activism as the third lies in the importance of the gains of political advocacy after the concrete results that made the Genocide visible on the international agenda. It also goes beyond rescuing the issue from oblivion as the third stage ends up becoming what in IR Theory is known as "Track Two" diplomacy in the context of the globalization of world politics after the end of Cold War.¹⁴ Its importance lies in its role within the strategy of diplomatic engagement as a state policy, as I will discuss in my conclusion.

I.c. Rescuing the Collective Memory: Genocide and Identity Politics in Soviet Armenia

Under Soviet rule, the commemoration of the Armenian Genocide and the public memorial services for the victims were compelled to official silence, with a discrete permission to publish material about the Genocide as of the mid-1960s.¹⁵ According to Claire Mouradian, following the Turkish-Soviet friendship treaty signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921, an article in *Jizn' Natsionalnosti* (Life of Nations), a publication of the Commissariat of the Nationalities under the direction of Stalin, defined the main lines of the official interpretation of the Genocide. Accordingly, the mass extermination of the Armenians and their disappearance from eastern Anatolia is not denied but explained according to a Marxist perspective: the Armenian "nationalist small bourgeois" class was to be blamed for the resolution of the Armenian Question as it hoped for foreign intervention. In any case, as the revolutionaries in both the former Ottoman and Tsarist empires won the struggle, Turkish and Armenian people were from the on tied together and revolutionary solidarity would help them to overcome ancient nationalist antagonism.¹⁶ This does not mean, of course, that there was no awareness among the elite of Soviet Armenia of the fading away of the collective memory, and the need to rescue it. Research on how the memory of the Genocide survived the Stalinist period, what strategy was adopted to preserve it, how April 24 was commemorated, how during the early de-Stalinization period the topic started to circulate on the non-official national agenda, and other related questions is still a task to be performed.

It is fair, however, to consider the demand for a memorial of the Genocide and the March 16, 1965 official decision to, in fact, build a monument as the starting

point of the effort to give the issue public visibility. The main task of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Armenia at the time, Yakov Zaroubyan became to sway Moscow's resistance and get approval for the project of what became the Tsitsenakabert Memorial Complex.¹⁷ Both events in the critical year 1965 indicated the main aim and direction of identity politics for the following two decades in Soviet Armenia, a process that followed its own logic with little contact and certainly no political-strategic coordination with the parallel process in the Diaspora. Indeed, the aim was to rescue the memory of the Genocide and give it public visibility, and the main actors were Soviet Armenia's intellectuals. The main battlefield was history, whereas literature and art in general assumed the role of public diffusion.

Armenian historiography started to deal with the topic of the Genocide immediately after Stalin's death, a decade before the critical juncture of 1965, and a series of publications made the early effort to break off from the then prevailing official interpretation of the most recent period of Armenian history.¹⁸ From the late 1960s, a new generation of historians started to discuss more specifically the issue of the Genocide and its consequences. Some of the early efforts include Harutyun Turshyan's *The Heroic Battle of Sardarapat*, which was first published in 1965 and, later, in a second edition of 30,000 copies. While talking about Sardarabad, the book also discussed the Genocide, stating that the intentions of the Turkish government were to exterminate Armenians in Eastern Armenia too. In the same year, Aghasi Yesayan, a professor at Yerevan State University and a lawyer, published *The Armenian Question and International Diplomacy*. John Kirakosyan was the first to undertake research on the Genocide properly in his 1965 book *World War I and the Western Armenians*. A comprehensive compilation of archival materials and articles on the Armenian Genocide, edited by academic Mkrtych Nersisyan, with the title *The Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire*, was published in 1966. The distinctive characteristic of the book was that it came out first in Russian and was later translated into Armenian.

Parallel to historiography, the issue of the Genocide also started to become a central theme in the works of Armenian artists, poets and writers. After 1965, Hovhannes Shiraz, Paruyr Sevak, Gevorg Emin, Silva Kaputikyan (poets), Khachik Dashtents (writer), Minas Avetisyan (painter) Grigor Khanjian (painter), started to refer to the issue in their works. In Yerevan as well as other Armenian towns and villages monuments dedicated to the memory of the victims of the Genocide multiplied. There is little doubt that the leadership of Soviet Armenia did, in fact, gain permission from Moscow to promote the issue within the official perspective, another research topic still to be undertaken. Yet, although this was allowed almost exclusively within the context of the 29,000 sq. km. of the Republic, it did not mean its inclusion within the Soviet agenda. Nor, perhaps, could anyone even imagine any political advocacy in Moscow and other Soviet Republics. The exception was the Armenian dissident movement, which was also perhaps even more circumscribed within the national context. Could the Soviet Armenian elite have made an additional effort but stopped short? Or is it the case that no matter how hard it tried, the limitations of going beyond identity politics and pushing the topic onto the official Soviet agenda were even stricter than in the

case of the Diaspora, which, at least, had greater freedom of movement? This indeed, is a pending debate that needs serious analysis.

Looking back to the critical quarter century of 1965-1991, the efforts in the Diaspora to take the Genocide out of oblivion and install it on the international agenda do not lose their almost epic aspect. No less important has the struggle in Soviet Armenia been in making the Genocide a current issue in the collective memory of the people; for there should be no doubt that if left to Moscow, even in the de-Stalinization period, the official interpretation would have continued. In fact, the relative tolerance from the Kremlin did not mean any essential change in Soviet-Turkish relations after 1921; the topic of Genocide did not make its way to other Soviet Republics, nor was it discussed in the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, Moscow watched carefully any attempt at serious cooperation between the Diaspora and Soviet Armenia and did not encourage the efforts of recognition. The Soviet posture towards the Genocide obeyed the logic of the Cold War's bipolar competition with its opponent, the United States; whenever the US needed to involve Turkey, Armenian claims met with greater tolerance. Yet, the ritual of the remembrance of the "Kemal-Lenin friendship" was always there to remind that no tolerance would ever reach a level where the principles of the Treaty of Moscow, especially regarding the border issue, would be questioned.¹⁹

This is why the main achievements of the first stage of official public recognition of the Genocide had been exclusively the result of the Diaspora's political mobilization. The reversal of the denial and arguably the first turning-point²⁰ of a twenty-year-long struggle was the inclusion of the Armenian Genocide in the 1985 report by Benjamin Whitaker, the Special Rapporteur for the UN Commission on Human Rights' Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.²¹ The next important step was the European Parliament's June 18, 1987 resolution, which made the recognition of the Genocide a condition for Turkish inclusion in the European Union accession process. Notwithstanding the importance of other achievements, including parliamentary resolutions in Argentina (1985) and public declarations of Francois Mitterand (France, 1986) and Raúl Alfonsín (Argentina, 1987), there is little doubt that only the UN report and European Parliament resolution were the achievements that mattered most from an international perspective; they included a power play involving Turkey in its political calculations.

However, getting the Genocide on the international agenda was only a first step. It opened the way to what might be framed as a power struggle for truth between the ongoing politics of denial and its dismantling. It started a competition between the conservation of an international order of denial and the challenge to change it. Yet, the achievements were more rewarding internally to the Diaspora than affecting any Turkish national interest, at least not any with which Ankara would have serious difficulty dealing. The power struggle for truth addressed an ethical issue in a world where ethics still trailed behind politics and did not challenge the overall structure of the balance of power. Simply put, the power struggle for truth involved a state actor, in fact a middle power, and a non-state actor; it was still outside the inter-state context.

Section II. State Building, Genocide, and the Reluctance to Make the Issue a State Policy

The emergence of the Karabagh Movement in 1988, and the ensuing process for independence created the opportunity to finally find a main and legitimate actor able to push the Genocide as a political issue onto the international agenda. During the popular mobilization of 1988, the issue came on the agenda; the pogroms of Sumgait, Kirovabad and Baku, as well as the forced exodus of up to 500,000 Armenians living in Azerbaijan running from violent hostility were interpreted as an extension of the Genocide and the sacrifice of Armenia that the politics of Lenin, Stalin and their successor required on the eastern front.²² However, even before independence the reluctance to include the Genocide as an issue on the official agenda of the popular movement became clear, especially in the debate about the Declaration of Independence. As recorded, the issue of the Genocide gave rise to the longest and most heated debate when the Supreme Soviet of Armenia discussed the text of the soon to be promulgated Declaration on the Independence of Armenia on August 23, 1990. Ter Petrosian, at that time president of the Supreme Soviet, argued against including a clause about the Genocide because doing so would be wrong from both a political and a diplomatic viewpoint. Intellectuals like Rafayel Ishkhanian, who at that time identified themselves with the ideology and the goals of the Armenian National Movement, argued about the "emotionality" of the issue as opposed to a "rational" political approach centered on achieving independence and building the State. Accordingly, Armenia would achieve nothing even if various States or the United Nations recognized the Genocide. A majority of MPs, however, did not agree with Ter Petrosian. One hundred and thirty-one voted in favor of including a paragraph to the effect that the Republic of Armenia would support efforts to achieve international recognition of the Armenian Genocide; only twenty-five voted against. The final text in the Declarations states: "The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia."²³

Had the Genocide remained outside the Declaration of Independence, the whole meaning of identity politics would have needed reconsideration. Moreover, it certainly would have created a dangerous schism between Armenia and the Diaspora. Its inclusion in the Declaration, however, did not ensure its translation into an issue on the foreign policy agenda, and less for diplomatic engagement. Quite the opposite, identity politics regarding the Genocide issue remained part of Armenian internal political dynamics both in the context of the power struggle in the Republic of Armenia and Armenia-Diaspora relations. In fact, it would never end completely, even after the official inclusion of the issue on the foreign policy agenda in 1998. Episodes like the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, and, more importantly, the so-called "Football Diplomacy," showed the lack of a national consensus in the way the issue should figure on the Armenian foreign policy agenda.

II.a. Raison d'Etat, Pragmatism, and Genocide: The Ter Petrosian Government and its Legacy

Despite its inclusion in the Declaration of Independence, the Armenian Genocide was excluded from Armenia's foreign policy agenda during the presidency of Levon Ter Petrosian. The main ideologue of the first Armenian independent government, Ter Petrosian's advisor, Gerard J. Libaridian, explains this position in wider terms as "two different worldviews" in Armenian political thinking. "The first group consists of the pragmatists, people who want to use the opportunity of statehood to return Armenia and Armenians to the fold of humanity as 'normal' people. The second group believes statehood should be used as a vehicle to achieve a "higher" purpose, quality, mission, or program."²⁴ The difference, then, for this line of reasoning is primarily between rational State-centered thinking and a cultural/psychological aspect of Armenian political thinking, which, in another context, Gaïdz Minassian characterizes as "Haïtadism," a highly symbolic concept that reflects from a sociological perspective "the meeting of the toughness of the real world and the psychosis of ethnic extinction ... an eternal conflict between the reason to live and the phobia of death."²⁵

Ter Petrosian and his followers conceptualized their politics as "realist-pragmatist", aiming at building an independent democratic state and free market economy as well as establishing peaceful relations with all its neighbors. From this perspective, normalizing relations with Turkey gained priority, as the opening of the borders was seen as both a geopolitical necessity to break Armenia's landlocked isolation and dependence on Russia and to seize the opportunity of economic cooperation, including trans-border projects of integration. Despite its complexity and controversies, which became all too clear from the very first attempts to base the relations on an exclusively business-driven pragmatic approach, Ter Petrosian's strategy was coherent with the then predominant global model of liberal democracy and free market economy, which Ter Petrosian and his followers adopted as their own at the time of transition from the communist to the capitalist system and during the process of first accumulation of capital through the process of privatization.

The exclusion of the Armenian Genocide from the foreign policy agenda deepened the split between the Diaspora and the Ter Petrosian government, leading to open clashes. For some analysts, the split is explained in terms of the difference of the centrality of the issue of Genocide on the respective political and organizational agendas of the Diaspora and Homeland respectively.²⁶ The relevance of this difference cannot be argued as the determinant factor for the split without considerations relevant to the political economy of the transition. However, remarkable the extent to which Ter Petrosian personally performed public confrontations with representatives of the Diaspora, including highly respected intellectuals who pioneered the inclusion of the Genocide on the international agenda. The highest point of this clash, arguably, was during the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the Genocide in 1995, when the President and his advisor, Libaridian, publicly discredited Prof. Richard Hovannisian, declaring that the Genocide was a historical issue, not a political one.²⁷

It certainly is incorrect to suspect Ter Petrosian, or any member of the Armenian National Movement, of denialism. Yet, clearly he did not consider the Genocide a top priority, for Armenia's foreign policy was directed towards the normalization of relations with Turkey, and Armenia's first president tried hard to convince the rulers in Ankara to accept his pragmatism formulated in terms of "relations without preconditions." Whether this for Ter Petrosian meant dealing with the issue later on, or simply accepting the highest stage of pragmatism, whereby the truth of the Genocide would remain relative and there would be a gentleman's agreement to respect the opponent's point of view and continue doing business as usual, is irrelevant, for Ankara's interest was, precisely, to get Yerevan to declare publicly its abandonment of the issue.²⁸ In other words, Ankara wanted Ter Petrosian to go beyond his pragmatic silence with respect to the international recognition of the Genocide and drop the issue completely, a price that he did not want, or did not know how, to pay. Ter Petrosian resigned in February 1998 without achieving normalization of relations with Turkey. Yet, he left as a lasting legacy the "pragmatic" formulation of Armenia's policy towards Turkey, namely of "normal relations without pre-conditions."

II.b. Commitment ma non troppo: Kocharian and the Politics of Resistance

With the successor of Levon Ter Petrosian, Armenia's official policy towards the Genocide changed. Robert Kocharian announced that he would include the international recognition of the Genocide on his foreign policy agenda, and did so during his speech at the 53rd General Assembly of the United Nations on September 25, 1998, when he highlighted the importance of recognizing the Armenian Genocide as a means to further prevent such actions.²⁹ Kocharian's first address at the UN General Assembly could be considered as the turning point of Armenia's State policy regarding the Genocide. From that day on, two important features of Genocide recognition efforts have become relevant. The first one is the end of official Armenian self-restriction in the international context when it comes to addressing the issue. The second is Kocharian's success in bringing the Diaspora back onto Armenia's foreign policy agenda, carefully avoiding frustrating its large sectors as his predecessor had done while trying to engage only those who would support his policies.

Indeed, since 1998 no Armenian official has kept silent regarding the international recognition of the Genocide. Quite the opposite; Armenia has asked for international recognition of the Genocide and linked the issue to international commitment to prevent the crime whenever the opportunity presented itself, including during meetings with Turkish officials. The latter point stands in remarkable contrast to Ter Petrosian's policy, considering that a statement about the Genocide in Istanbul in 1992 by then Foreign Minister Raffi Hovhannisian led to his resignation. One of the most resonant speeches was that of Kocharian's Foreign Minister, Vartan Oskanian, at the 57th General Assembly of the United Nations:

I wish to take the opportunity this podium provides to re-iterate President Kocharian's statement before this General Assembly two years ago to work for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and to prevent

the repetition of such human atrocity. We extend our profound appreciation to all those governments, legislatures, and international bodies that have recognized the Armenian Genocide, and pledge our cooperation to all those that are currently in the process of reaffirming the facts of this crime against humanity. As a signatory of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Armenian Government places a high priority on the struggle to prevent future genocides and to stand up against all attempts to deny past genocides. We support all initiatives that reinforce the international consensus behind this landmark treaty.³⁰

The importance of this statement lies in the official Armenian support for the efforts of the Diaspora to achieve recognition of the Genocide in different countries. Indeed, the change of the official policy with regard to the Genocide in 1998 gave a real boost to these efforts. Worth mentioning among others are the introduction of a bill recognizing the Genocide in the US Congress in 2000, aborted only with direct intervention from the White House; the French Law recognizing the Genocide in 2001; the public announcement by *The New York Times*, *Time* magazine and other international press organs that when using the term genocide when referring to 1915 they would not put it in quotes or qualify the issue with terms such as “so-called” or “alleged;” the Argentine Law recognizing the Genocide in 2007; and, last but not least, the inclusion in France and other countries in public debates of punishment by law of the denial of the Genocide. A complete list of the political achievements in the Diaspora for the international recognition of the Genocide is beyond the scope of this study; what, however, is important to highlight is that putting an end to the official reluctance to address the issue of Genocide from 1998 on has facilitated the efforts of the Diaspora’s political activism. It has at least stopped short the argument of a so-called difference between Diaspora and Homeland, which Ter Petrosian’s policy, willingly or not, had offered to Turkey and other countries facing the demand of recognition. There is an obvious difference between the stagnation of these efforts in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. It would not be wrong to consider that the Diaspora’s political activism has taken a qualitative jump and created a global structure securing not only a space for the Genocide on the international agenda but also opening new fields and venues to make the issue part of the collective human commitment aimed at making the world safe from any other attempt at genocidal politics. True, this relative optimism is still contradicted by an international context where, as Juan Gabriel Tokatlian warns,³¹ the drive for power is once again facilitating conditions for mass atrocities and impunity. Yet, the fact is that Armenian references in terms of scholarly publications, expertise, artistic creations, participation in debates and global campaigns are a reality today.

Kocharian’s initiative to change the Ter Petrosian policy was not a pragmatic turn motivated by the failure of his predecessor’s perspective aiming at repairing an internal strife within the nation. Making the international recognition of the Genocide a state policy with its definition as a national security issue led to yet another step forward, as stated in the National Security Strategy: “Armenia aspires to the universal recognition and condemnation, including by Turkey, of the

Armenian Genocide, and sees it both as a restoration of historical rights and as a way to improve the overall situation in the region, while also preventing similar crimes in the future.”³²

Yet, even during Kocharian’s two terms, some clouds remained on the horizon, casting doubts on the government’s real intentions. For example, the Foreign Ministry did not react firmly against the denial of the Genocide when some diplomats, including the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom and Israel, publicly made controversial statements concerning the issue, despite public outrage and condemnation in both Armenia and the Diaspora.³³ Most importantly, the obscure episode of the so-called Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) raised suspicions of a yet unclear orientation from the Foreign Ministry.³⁴ It is true that Kocharian stood firm in his refusal to the proposal by Ankara in 2005 for a joint “commission of historians” to study the question of the Genocide; nevertheless, silently at least, Yerevan looked for ways to establish a dialogue with Turkey following the principle of “negotiations without preconditions,” which proved that the Ter Petrosian legacy was still alive.

II.c. The Great Gamble: Genocide and Sarkisian’s “Football Diplomacy”

The so-called “football diplomacy” of Kocharian’s successor, Serge Sarkisian, and the ensuing Turkish-Armenian Protocols in October 2009³⁵ to normalize the relations between the two countries illustrate the persistence of the Ter Petrosian legacy. Moreover, they constitute the first real attempt to apply the principal of “relations without preconditions.” At the same time, they reveal the poverty of the principle and show its irrelevance for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, proving the impossibility of avoiding the question of Genocide without falling into the denialist trap.

It is too soon to have any strong argument based on empirical evidence for objective analysis of the episode, which despite its freezing since April of 2010 is not completely dead. Nevertheless, so far it seems that the initiative came from Sarkisian in an attempt to ease international pressure on his government after the controversial elections of February 19, 2008 and the following bloodshed when, on March 2, 2008, security forces cracked down on the violent manifestation of Ter Petrosian’s followers, who rejected the results of the election. Normalizing relations with Turkey was Washington’s policy, with the EU’s support, for reasons arguably related to both geopolitics and the increasing pressure of the Diaspora for official US recognition of the Genocide, including, for example, the ability of American-Armenian political activism to block in Congress Washington’s foreign policy initiatives. It is important to highlight that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement initiative came from Yerevan in June 2008, and, to make it attractive to Ankara, Sarkisian did not dismiss the possibility of a joint commission to study the past, including the Genocide. The President declared this at first, before retreating from this position later. The argument that the “football diplomacy” was the consequence of the August 2008 War of Five Days between Georgia and Russia, justified by the real threat of a complete isolation of Armenia in case of a prolonged closure of the borders with Georgia, is post-factum; the war only prompted Turkish interest in proposing its Caucasian Stability Initiative and,

probably, provided pragmatic Russian agreement aimed at distancing Turkey from NATO.

No matter what the true reasons may be, the whole process of engaging Turkey is full of details that reveal at best a pragmatism that gave priority to the agreement and left the issue of Genocide on a second tier. During all the phases of the "football diplomacy," the successive messages of the President to the Armenians reflected his commitment to "never forget" the Genocide, or to agree to a "commission of historians," as the Turkish side still insisted in its interpretation of the Protocols. In other words, Sarkisian tried to distinguish his policy from Ter Petrosian's. However, there are many facts that explain the widespread perception, especially in the Diaspora, of an unacceptable level of pragmatism leading to a novel way of "forgetting" the Genocide. These facts include taking the Mount Ararat symbol off the emblem of Armenia's national soccer team before the match against Turkey, signing the "Road Map" on the eve of April 24, 2009, rejecting proposals in the National Assembly to toughen the measures against Genocide denial in Armenia, and others.

Nevertheless, beyond any analysis of the motivations and aims of the Turkey-Armenia deal, what matters most for the sake of the present study are the consequences and the impact of the process. In the Armenian national context, both the content of the agreement and the way it was negotiated between Yerevan and Ankara provoked commotion and revived the concerns of a Diaspora-Homeland split. Neither Sarkisian's policy to rally some of the most prestigious Armenian civil society organizations, the Church, and the rich and famous, nor his last-minute tour to Russia, Europe, the Middle East and the US to assure the Diaspora of his commitment to exclude the Genocide from the agreement helped much. Though relying on the public support of some central figures of the Diaspora, the President met almost everywhere - Beirut, Paris, New York and Los Angeles - massive rallies and widespread popular rejection of his initiative.

The agreement was finally reached under heavy pressure from Washington and European capitals on October 10, 2009 and hailed worldwide as a step forward for an enduring peace. The reality, however, stood in sharp contradiction to what mainstream mass media reported. Beyond the formality of the agreement, Armenia and Turkey had different interpretations, not only about its content, but also about the way it would be implemented. Armenia submitted the agreement to the Constitutional Court, prior to submitting it to the National Assembly for its ratification. It was clear that for Sarkisian the constitutional process mattered in order to assure the legality of his move and increase its legitimacy, as he probably realized that the agreement would hardly create any national consensus. The priority given to the constitutional process also reflected the lack of a strategy or agreement on Armenia's foreign policy agenda. It seemed that reaching the agreement was an end in itself without any serious consideration beyond the formality of signing it. Overall, Armenia's post-Protocols policy could be characterized as damage control on the internal front while waiting for Turkey's move. In fact, Sarkisian, wisely enough, ended pre-conditioning the ratification of the agreement in the same direction of his counterpart. In stark opposition to Armenia's strategic stagnation, Ankara immediately seized the opportunity of the

agreement to start a global campaign against the Diaspora's political mobilization for the international recognition of the Genocide. For Turkey, the agreement provided a novel argument for its denialist policy, according to which both countries had already decided to study the matter through a commission; therefore, any attempt to recognize the Genocide would jeopardize the peace initiative. Within two or three months, right after the signing of the agreement, Turkish diplomacy had already started a worldwide campaign to instill in public opinion the idea of a mutual agreement to study the question through a commission. At the same time, the Turkish campaign tried to create and deepen strife between the Diaspora and Armenia, aiming mostly at weakening the Diaspora's global structure pushing for the international recognition of the Genocide and its repatriation. Armenian diplomacy remained at best passive in face of the Turkish campaign; there was no convincing counterargument except the denial of any predisposition to discuss the question of Genocide in a joint commission, no clear explanation about the nature of that commission, and no initiative to coordinate a counter-denialist move with the Diaspora. In short, Armenian diplomacy had fallen into the trap of "negotiations without preconditions" principle.

Yet, whereas the Genocide was the most important issue for Turkey's international policy and its aim was to at least contain the Diaspora, Ankara's main concern with Armenia was the question of Karabagh and confirmation of the current borders between Turkey and Armenia set by the 1921 Moscow Treaty between the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks. Indeed, facing the anger of its own nationalist opposition at home and that of its ally, Azerbaijan, the government of Erdogan ended up insisting upon the resolution of the Karabagh conflict as a precondition to proceeding further with the ratification of the agreement. By January 2010, it became clear that the biggest challenge for Ankara was indeed the question of Karabagh, in which it inevitably had to deal with Moscow, the main power broker in the Caucasus.

The Turkey-Armenia Protocols and their aftermath revealed the truth of the Ter Petrosian legacy. The principal of "relations without preconditions" was a failure because Turkey had no interest in normalizing its relations with Armenia, if the normalization would not lead to resolving three issues of strategic importance for Ankara: resolving the conflict of Nagorno Karabagh in favor of Azerbaijan, ensuring the end of the efforts for the international recognition of the Genocide, and confirming the current borders with Armenia.

II.d. Soviet Legacy, Transition and Foreign Policy Social Construction: Explaining the Roots of State Reluctance to Include Genocide on the International Agenda

From the Declaration of Independence on September 21, 1991 to the January 12, 2010 Resolution of Armenia's Constitutional Court with regard to the constitutionality of the October 10, 2009 Turkish-Armenian agreement, including specifically Armenia's National Security Strategy, the legal ground for an active engagement with the Genocide as a foreign policy issue is strong. So far, however, Armenia lacks a diplomatic course reflecting an engagement with the issue of Genocide beyond rhetoric. The occasional, circumstantial and sporadic public

commitments to such an agenda have not been translated into concrete projects, or a course of action. As a matter of fact, there is no department or sector in Armenia's Foreign Ministry dedicated to the issue of the Genocide, there are no diplomats with expertise in the field, and there are no directives for an ongoing policy line. The failure seems to be of a structural nature more than due to differences in policies from one government to another.

By "structural" I mean a phenomenon rooted in a socially constructed order that historically shapes collective and individual worldviews, sets of values, priorities and political behaviors that resist, at least for some time, radical changes. "Structural" is not synonymous with everlasting persistence; politics eventually determine the course of events, which, in turn, shapes social orders and structures. Yet it is important to underline that "politics" should be understood in terms of social construction and not random policies or ad hoc decisions. From this theoretical perspective, the analytical challenge is to highlight the dynamics of the social construction leading to eventual structural changes, whereas the normative approach underlines both a critical apprehension of the "objectivity" of any social analysis and an engagement to define a course for the above-mentioned dynamics.

I argue that the structural causes underlying first the reluctance to engage diplomatically with the Genocide issue after independence, and, after 1998, the failure to define a consistent and dynamic diplomatic engagement beyond rhetoric has to do with the Soviet legacy, the post-Soviet transition, and the dominant free-market logic in Armenian politics. Of these three factors, the first one is historical, the second global-systemic, and the third a matter of choice of the dominant elite and the emerging ruling class. Two observations are important to make before proceeding to explain briefly each factor. First, in characterizing my analysis as "structural," I mean also that the three factors are related and interact with each other, despite the fact that ideologically they might seem mutually exclusive. In other words, my argument does not see any incompatibility between the factors of "Soviet legacy" and state-building after independence and the adoption of free-market logic in Armenian politics. Second, "structural," however, is not synonymous with the notion that the course of events could not have taken a different path, and even less does it mean that it is unchangeable. Structural explanations highlight the deeper, and more persistent, causes, often with historic roots and embedded with emerging interests defined in power terms. Structural explanations are helpful not only for a better understanding of the phenomenon, but also to avoid simplistic normative arguments when criticizing a given policy and advocating for change.

The "Soviet legacy" factor refers to the lack of experience in diplomatic engagement in relation to the question of the Genocide. The reason is quite obvious: Soviet Armenia did not have a foreign policy independent from Moscow, as sovereign states do. There was no shortage of Soviet statesmen and career diplomats either of Armenian descent or from Soviet Armenia in more than seven decades of the Soviet Union. Yet, no matter how well trained and skillful these diplomats and statesmen were, the Soviet Union did not have the Armenian Genocide, let alone the issue of genocide in general, on its foreign policy agenda, and even less, in the late 1970s and during the 1980s, when the question gained

momentum on the international stage. Had the case been different, efforts from the Diaspora would probably have found a way to link up with Soviet international politics. For, no matter how critical of Moscow, or even strongly anti-Soviet might have been the sectors pushing the issue of the Genocide on the international agenda, a gesture from the Kremlin would have had a tremendous emotional and mobilizing impact, as *nergaght* had in 1946-48.³⁶ But this was not the case. Soviet diplomats of Armenian origin did not gain any experience in dealing with the issue of the Genocide because it was not on Moscow's agenda. The Soviet legacy factor is consistent in its logic with the previous argument about the process of the revival of the memory of the Armenian Genocide in Soviet Armenia from 1965 on; the political activism reflected a nationalist reaction to Moscow's particular "silence" about the issue and made official what so far has been remembered in a non-visible form in the Republic, but it did not lead to promoting recognition in the Soviet context. Therefore, the Soviet legacy factor is not about the success of the dominant internationalist ideology in eradicating, or diminishing, nationalism in Armenia; quite the opposite; along with Georgia, Armenia was the former Soviet Republic where fifty-three percent of the people identified themselves with their history.³⁷ Nor, by the same token, does the Soviet legacy refer to a Western-Eastern Armenian division and their supposedly separated views with respect to the Genocide issue.

In addition to the lack of any political experience of promoting Genocide recognition as an issue on the foreign agenda, the global context within which the post-Soviet transition happened also conditioned any possible effort to somehow quickly get rid of the Soviet Legacy. Two features of the global context of the post-Soviet transition are relevant in this sense. First, the transition was hailed as an ideological victory of the West, with claims that the coming global liberal order was what "ends" history.³⁸ The argument ran first and foremost against the socialist perspective of progress in history, yet broadly, it also dismissed the relevance of competing ideological forces behind the fall of Communism other than liberal democracy, including, though analytically quite wrongly, nationalism. Moreover, under the heavy impact of the war in the Balkans, often characterized as "ethnic conflicts," nationalism became normatively unacceptable, if not a sort of "source for evil..." Now, whether consciously or not, and no matter to what extent embedded in a discourse of Human Rights, the 1965-85 mobilization in both the Diaspora and the Homeland for the international recognition of the Genocide was primarily the defense of a national cause. It did not, at least within these two decades, gain support as a human responsibility, as did the Holocaust in the aftermath of WWII, the Allies' victory over Nazi Germany and, most importantly, Nuremberg. On the other hand, the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide could not escape the geopolitical controversy of the Cold War, especially after the inclusion of Turkey in NATO. The Cold War did end, but NATO was not dismantled, nor did Turkey abandon it; the geopolitical controversy around the issue of recognition continued after the fall of the Soviet Union. Eager to receive Western acceptance for Armenia's independence after the rise of the All-Armenian National Movement and the formation of the first government, the leaders of the new State embraced the ethos of the triumphant

Western liberal order within which the “nationalist” weight of the two decades-long struggle for the international recognition of the Genocide did not find its proper formulation as a State policy. The second feature of the global context of post-Soviet transition was the eagerness of world powers to avoid a chaotic process in the Eurasian continent that could have led to further territorial fragmentation and, consequently, nuclear proliferation. As a result, the fall of the Soviet Union did not lead to questioning of the principle of territorial integrity, and change of borders was left out of the agenda, despite the centrality of the issue in the periphery—Nagorno Karabagh, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, and Chechnya. Leaving out of the international agenda any change of borders or territorial demands in the coming of age of a new world order had its impact on the way the issue of the international recognition of Genocide has been politicized in the last twenty-five years, as the struggle defined a lineal perspective of recognition and reparation, defined in terms of territorial restitution. It is worth recording that the popular outburst in April 1965 in Yerevan demanded “Our lands, our lands,” and, in the same year, arguably the first recognition of the Armenian Genocide, in the Uruguayan Parliament, was a law that referred to the Treaty of Sèvres and its implementation through the United Nations. Whether for political wisdom as “prudence” and “pragmatism,” to quote former president Ter Petrosian’s frequently used concepts, or for strategic consideration—normalizing relations with Turkey to counterbalance Russia, seeing the road to Europe through Turkey—the state-building process in Armenia, as Libaridian understood it in its contradiction to the so-called “Hay Tadism,” pretended to avoid any suspicion of nationalistic aspirations, territorial demands, or opposition to the hegemonic “*pensée unique*” of the liberal world-order, with the exception of Nagorno Karabagh. This, in turn, led to exclusion of the Genocide from the foreign agenda.

The liberal world order was not only liberal democracy, but also free-market economy in its neoclassical/Monetarist variant. The transition process and state-building in Armenia, arguably as in all former Soviet republics copying the dominant Russian example, meant also embracing the shock-therapy model of privatization and liberalization of the former state-planned economy.³⁹ This led to the primary accumulation of capital through a formally competitive process, which, in fact, was deeply corrupt and criminal in its implementation.⁴⁰ Another common feature of economic transition in the former Soviet Union was the concentrating of both political and economic power, a process that Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann conceptualize as “state capture.”⁴¹ The transition ended up consolidating a social order with high levels of wealth and power concentration, which, nevertheless, still looked for its legitimacy in the dominant ideological paradigm of liberal democracy and free-market economy. No matter how foreign liberalism democracy might be, and how incompatible monopolistic capitalism might be with the claimed free-market approach, this ideological framework shaped not only interests but also worldview, values and organic intellectual ideas to assure the continuity of its legitimation. It is therefore no coincidence that market fundamentalism also shaped the main argument for the push to open borders, maintaining, through Western, mainly U.S., funded studies that such a perspective would lead to a dramatic increase of Armenia’s GDP.⁴² This dominant

ideology, rooted in the order shaped through the transition to capitalism, in turn, makes it hard to think “out-of-the-box” about the ways the Genocide could be included on the foreign policy agenda without necessarily considering it a sort of alien body to the vision of the world as a global free market.

The three factors together, Soviet legacy, post-Soviet transition and free-market ideology, explain the endurance of the common denominator of Armenia’s foreign policy from Ter Petrosian to Sarkisian: “Relations [with Turkey] without preconditions.” This principle does not exclude the issue of the Genocide on the bilateral agenda, in the case of normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations; it, nevertheless, does not avoid the diplomatic trap of Turkey seizing any gesture of rapprochement as an opportunity to score points on its denialist agenda in the international context. It therefore is important for Armenia to change the so-far prevailing course and think about a diplomatic engagement with the issue of the Genocide.

Section III. The Genocide on Armenia’s Foreign Policy Agenda: From Rhetoric to Diplomatic Engagement

In what follows I develop a normative argument for diplomatic engagement with the issue of the Genocide as a State policy. I base the theoretical groundwork for the proposal on what I consider the three pillars for a diplomatic engagement on the issue of the Genocide; then I compare the cases of Israel and Argentina, as two countries that adopted different paths of engagement with the issue of genocide after suffering it; finally I define a strategy for diplomatic engagement for Armenia, based on the singularity of the Genocide, balancing the previously studied Israeli and Argentinean cases.

III.a. The Theoretical Groundwork: The Three Pillars for a Diplomatic Engagement with the Issue of Genocide

Diplomatic engagement with the issue of the Genocide is a matter of national security; it provides strategic competitiveness for Armenia’s foreign policy, and it is essential to strengthen a Diaspora-Homeland common identity. These are the three pillars of the theoretical argument for the normative claim formulated in this paper. They are intrinsically related, in that if diplomatic engagement is embraced, then no possible concession or retreat from it will become possible. In this sense, diplomatic engagement becomes a state policy beyond the preferences of the government in place and above all ideological or other concerns.

Of the three pillars, the first is explained through a Realist perspective, as it deals with the basic issue of unity and survival in an anarchic international system, following Kenneth N. Waltz’s theory.⁴³ The argument of the unrecognized Genocide, an unpunished crime, being a threat to Armenia’s national security is already formulated in the National Security Strategy as previously explained. How the argument translates into praxis and in which state policy fields is the question. Obviously, a matter of national security is relevant first and foremost for defense; yet defense policy is rationalized only in its relation to the given country’s definition of its place in the world, which is conceptualized as a Grand Strategy. Though not formulated literally, the subject of the Genocide in Armenia’s national

security document implies at least a potential perception of threat and at most a hypothesized conflict with Turkey. Because of the brutal asymmetry in power relations between Armenia and Turkey, the answer to this potential threat perception/conflict hypothesis cannot be solely military; hence, the argument should find its place on the foreign policy agenda.

The second pillar of a diplomatic engagement, is conceptually sustained from an institutionalist perspective proper to better understand and act in an interdependent world.⁴⁴ Engagement with the Genocide is one of the few propositions that could ensure Armenia a space in international institutions. Armenia is irrelevant as a military power or economic giant; yet this irrelevance on the international agenda of “high politics” could be compensated with a high profile of Armenian foreign policy on the agenda of “low politics,” such as international law or human rights, if, of course, a strategy of engagement is defined, implemented and pursued as state policy.

As for the third pillar, Diaspora-Homeland common identity, it is best conceptualized through Social Constructivism in IR Theory, which reveals the importance of identity politics in international relations.⁴⁵ The importance of the Diaspora has rarely been underestimated since the early days of the independence process, and, with the exception of a part of the Ter Petrosian period when the official approach to the Diaspora reflected an attitude of “divide and rule” more than eagerness for national unity, it is reflected in the official discourse, as well as initiatives, including the three Homeland-Diaspora conferences in 1999, 2002 and 2006 and the creation of the Ministry of Diaspora in 2008. The issue of the Genocide cannot possibly be absent from Diaspora/Homeland dynamics, either in promoting the relationship or as a source of misunderstanding, as happened during President Sarkisian’s tour and meetings with the Armenian communities in Europe, the Middle East, Russia and the Americas on the verge of the signature of the Turkish-Armenian Protocols in October 2009. In fact, the latter event is symptomatic of the centrality of the issue for the Diaspora, whose political identity is embedded in a sense of justice. In other words, though promoting a common Homeland-Diaspora identity through the often officially used concept, “one nation, one culture,” is not, and cannot be, restricted to the Genocide issue, the latter nevertheless enjoys a hierarchical superiority in an ontological sense when it is conceived in its political dimension.

III.b. Israel and National Survival,⁴⁶ Argentina and the Promotion of the Right to Truth.

Not many countries have assumed a diplomatic engagement with the issue of genocide as a state policy. In fact, there is no perfect model to be followed. For *Raisons d’État*, questions related to human rights, and more particularly to genocide, are still considered “low politics.” Assuming that such an engagement is possible as an issue on the foreign agenda per se, and not at the service of some bargain, if governments engage with the issue of genocide, then it almost always is as a consequence of existing pressure from civil society or in the context of international organizations, mostly the UN. The cases of Israel and Argentina, two peoples who suffered genocide, are perhaps the sole exceptions. But whereas

engagement with the Holocaust in Israel’s case is closely linked to national survival, Argentina has made its engagement with genocide as a humanitarian topic part of its identity in world politics. A brief analysis of each case is helpful to define a strategy of engagement for Armenia.

The Israeli engagement with the Holocaust is strongly, and almost exclusively, linked to national survival, for which the state is considered the utmost insurance. “The trauma of the Holocaust—the wholesale destruction of European Jewry by Nazi Germany—made it plain that the possibility of annihilation as a people was as real in the modern age as it has always been.”⁴⁷ The relationship of the Holocaust with Israel’s national security is established officially within its Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948. Also the creation of the state happened at a time of urgency to receive the survivors of the Holocaust, as well as other Jews from all over the world, in order to ensure them a homeland, the guarantor of their right to a decent life and freedom. Moreover, the role of the Holocaust has been central in defining Israel’s national security in its “exceptionalism,” which is the basic argument for its military doctrine.⁴⁸ David Ben Gourion expressed his fear of another Holocaust on several occasions.⁴⁹ Israel’s foreign policy, thus, took a sharp Realpolitik turn from the early days of statehood based on three premises: the primacy of security, military force as a panacea for the resolution of security problems, and self-help; hence, Israel’s distrust of international organizations: “The ambivalence towards international guarantees, global conventions and multilateral resolutions is a reflection of a deep conviction in realist reasoning. David Ben-Gourion, Israel’s first prime minister, who stressed the principle of self-help and autarchy, argued that ‘Israel’s future will be determined first of all by our success in developing our own resources’.”⁵⁰

In contrast to Israel’s Realpolitik, Argentina’s tragic experience with genocide during the 1976-1983 dictatorship, leading to 30,000 “disappeared” people, provided the ground for a Moralpolitik turn to its foreign policy after the return of democracy. Argentina is the only country in South America that tried its military junta and condemned its members in 1985, during the presidency of Raúl Alfonsín. Moreover, the demand for justice promoted by civil society organizations initiated as early as 1979 by the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo was so strong that neither the controversial laws of Punto Final and Obediencia Debida which tried to put an end to court cases in 1987, or, worse, the 1992 amnesty of Carlos Saul Menem’s government for the jailed military could stop it. They could not turn the page of history as long as the whole truth about the “disappeared,” including the restoration of the identity of their children born during their detention and then given up for adoption, was not revealed. Social mobilization for truth and justice in Argentina had its impact on the country’s foreign policy, characterized since 1983 by its engagement with respect for international law, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and the promotion of peace.⁵¹ The Argentine engagement with Human Rights in general, and the issue of genocide in particular, on its foreign policy agenda is, therefore, one of the consequences of the country’s engagement with democracy and the rule of law. It is deeply rooted in the understanding of *Nunca Más*—Never More—as the report of the commission that was in charge of investigating the crimes of the dictatorship

(CONADEP) issued on September 20, 1984 is known. Learning from its own tragedy, Argentina, since 1983, has become a "global protagonist" and assumed a high profile in the struggle for International Human Rights.⁵² Furthermore, this engagement is proper for both civil society and the state. On the one hand the state is active in international agencies and initiatives, such as the creation of the International Criminal Court, the promotion of the Right to Truth, and the public defense of personalities like the Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón when they are attacked for their activism on Human Rights. Overcoming the traditional diplomatic self-restrictions in public declarations, civil society organizations, activists and intellectuals have won international recognition for their engagement, as is the case of the 1980 Nobel Peace laureate Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, or the International Criminal Court's prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, known for his indictment of Sudan's Omar Bashir, accused of promoting a genocidal policy in Darfur.

Israel and Argentina, therefore, offer two models of engagement with the issue of genocide, the first one from the perspective of Realpolitik, and the latter, Moralpolitik. Differentiating the two perspectives is not normative. Each engagement is explained in its own context, though, of course, each engagement is also a political decision, which leaves room for major flexibility in modifying each decision in one or another.

III.c. A Strategy for Armenia: The Singularity of the Genocide in Praxis

Comparatively speaking, the Armenian Genocide has more similarities with the Holocaust than the Argentinean genocide. Moreover, the non-recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the ongoing Turkish denialist policy make much more credible the case for considering engagement with the Genocide as a state policy a matter of national security from a threat perception perspective. Nevertheless, any Armenian strategy of diplomatic engagement with the Genocide should consider elements of both Realpolitik and Moralpolitik, inspired by the Israeli and Argentinean cases.

The main obstacle to relying exclusively on the Israeli Realpolitik approach lies in the Turkish-Armenian asymmetry of power, both military and economic; this is not Israel's case with its Arab neighbors. To this structural difference should be added the US as Israel's strategic ally in the Middle East, on the other hand, Armenia's major ally, in fact its insurance against Turkish aggression, is Russia. Despite the obvious power asymmetry between Israel and the US, their relationship is much more horizontal than the Armenian-Russian relationship. Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid, and the Holocaust is not only recognized by Washington but it is also a major moral argument for the American duty to assure Israel's existence, having failed to rescue European Jews from extermination. Russia's behavior towards Armenia still keeps its imperial character even in the economic field, where capitalism has created a new, perhaps more dangerous, dependency of the former Soviet Republic on Moscow. As for the Genocide, it was never considered on Moscow's foreign agenda in Soviet times, nor has it been included since the fall of the Soviet Union, even though the Duma recognised it.

In the Armenian case in comparison with Israel, the Realpolitik perspective of engagement with the Genocide is relevant mostly if one takes the third premise as a starting point for any strategic planning: self-help. Otherwise, an Armenian diplomatic engagement with the Genocide has to create a high, profile, as Argentina does, on the "low politics" international agenda of Moralpolitik issues. From this dual perspective, the main argument for an Armenian strategy for engagement with the Genocide is the singularity of the case: the "Forgotten." The stress on the singularity of the Genocide is different from the long time Israeli claim/argument about the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust, which also explains its Realpolitik—or stands as an argument to justify the approach and hold on to it. Perhaps the most visible success of Israel's Realpolitik approach is the 1998 Stockholm Declaration; the twenty-seven countries that signed the document assumed engagement in, among other things, promoting education about the Holocaust, its commemoration and research in their own countries, including the establishment of a Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust. Similar remembrance for the Armenian Genocide in countries like Uruguay, France, Argentina and Canada, to name those which have a law recognizing the Genocide, is a success of the Diaspora's mobilization, not Armenia's foreign policy. The argument that lay behind these successes is the humanitarian nature of the recognition, the main motivation being an identification of these countries with the Genocide as a just cause, a Human Rights issue; it is not an understanding of Armenia's concern as the guarantor of the survival of the Armenian people. Armenia's foreign policy should base its strategy of diplomatic engagement with the Genocide on the Diaspora's above-mentioned success.

Broadly speaking, the diplomatic engagement with the Genocide in international politics can be conceptualized as a power struggle for the Truth. It is, based on the singularity of the Genocide, a holistic understanding of the issue as necessary for both Armenia's national survival and the global promotion and empowerment of the Right to Truth.⁵³ This holistic approach linking Armenia's national survival to the promotion of the global engagement to prevent genocide is different from the lineal understanding of recognition-retribution-reconciliation-prevention; it takes its distance from the Israeli reluctance towards international organizations; and looks for strategic partnership with countries like Argentina that do not have any survival problem, yet are interested in the universal promotion of the Right to Truth.

At the same time, however, this strategy addresses the more narrowly defined Turkish-Armenian power struggle from a Realist perspective. Moreover, this strategy is a departure from the inflexible nature of the "relations without conditions" principle in Armenia's foreign policy, recognizing that it makes no sense, except as wishful thinking, when the Turkish denialist offensive as a state policy has never ceased to be a reality. In fact, the Turkish denialist offensive has so far imposed a "war of trenches," in Gramscian terms, on Armenia's foreign policy. Insisting on "relations without conditions" reflects a behavior of resistance to denial; even the international demand for recognition in Armenia's foreign policy rhetoric reflects resistance to denial.

The diplomatic engagement with genocide implies a strategic shift to a “war of movement,” in terms of a counter-offensive to denialism of any crime against humanity in the global arena. On the one hand, it overcomes the limitations of the discourse of “recognition”, denouncing complicity with denialism in general, including denial of the Armenian Genocide, and, on the other hand, it takes the lead in the power struggle for Truth in its universal understanding and in preemptive initiatives against the risk of new denialist prospects.

Conclusion: Redefining Complementarity

The strategy for a diplomatic engagement with the issue of the Genocide as a State policy implies a) making flexible the principle of “relations without preconditions” with Turkey through a holistic approach to recognition, reparation, reconciliation and prevention; b) redefining Vartan Oskanian’s doctrine of Complementarity in the national context.

Breaking the linear understanding of recognition, reparation, reconciliation and prevention means adopting a strategy whereby each factor stops being perceived as the successive link in a chain, where the beginning of a stage is conditioned by the completion of the previous one, gaining autonomy in an interactive relationship with the others. This, in fact, is what currently happens in the Diaspora after the success of making visible the Genocide on the international agenda. Lawsuits against banks or insurance companies to claim reparation, Turkish-Armenian academic cooperation in Genocide Studies, promotion of legal mechanisms to criminalize denial, and other initiatives accompany the ongoing struggle of recognition in several countries. Of course, the risk is that each initiative could become an end in itself and lose its interaction with other initiatives, yet this has to do more with leadership than with the nature of the phenomenon. In other words, the breaking of the formerly linear understanding of recognition, reparation, reconciliation and prevention is almost natural in the current historical context of globalization when linearity in general does not make much sense in the understanding of social phenomena; yet the coordination of different initiatives in recognition, reparation, reconciliation and prevention conceived and implemented autonomously is a matter of political will, strategic planning and capacity to assure the interaction of these initiatives. The diplomatic engagement with the issue of the Genocide as a state policy could assure this coordination. What is lacking so far in Armenia’s foreign policy is the decision to assume leadership in, and hence coordinate, the proliferation of these initiatives in the Diaspora and to provide an enduring national strategy. Once the political will emerges in this sense, the next step, naturally, would be institutional changes within the Foreign Ministry and investment in preparing the human factor in expertise in the field.

The nature of this diplomatic engagement, however, implies a strategic partnership between the Diaspora and the Homeland, for it involves, paraphrasing Putnam, a “two-level game,” whereby the logic of the “double-edged diplomacy” of the internal/external dimension of a diplomatic negotiation is replaced with the interactive process of state and “track-two” citizens’ diplomacy.⁵⁴ This, in turn, implies a reconceptualization of Armenia’s former Foreign Policy Minister Vartan

Oskanian’s “complementarity”,⁵⁵ shifting its context from external to internal and from the orientation of an East/West balance to Diaspora-Homeland dynamics. This Diaspora/Homeland complementarity is an invitation to a depart from a sharp separation between the logic of state action and civil society mobilization, which was formulated and promoted during the Ter Petrosian presidency by his advisor Jirair Libaridian, who insisted on the total sovereignty of the state allowing to act according to its interests. The approach was a failure, not only in its equivocation about the conceptual rigidity of sovereignty, but also in terms of the costs it implied for the state. Though Kocharian and Sarkisian did break with this approach of sharply separating state reason from civil society in an effort of rapprochement with the Diaspora, yet, as analyzed above, complementarity was not the name of the game; there was no strategic coordination in the long run between state policy and Diaspora mobilization. Changing this approach does not necessarily mean denying the reality of two different spheres that might be in conflict. It does, however, mean making an effort to bridge the gap between the spheres and assuring permanent interaction between them. The effort is justified ethically as it deals with the issue of genocide, which stands beyond the traditional Raisons d’État because of its humanitarian dimension. It is also inevitable for a diplomatic engagement with the issue of genocide, as any effort in this sense has always involved both the state and civil society.

ENDNOTES

¹ This paper is based on field work in Armenia (January-February 2010 and January-February 2011) done with the help of two of my former students, Anushavan Hambarzumyan and Galust Khanvelyan, to whom I express my deep gratitude. I also appreciate the comments received during the presentation of the paper from the participants, and especially the encouragement and observations of George Shirinian.

² See Robert F. Melson, “The Armenian Genocide as Precursor and Prototype of Modern Genocide” elsewhere in this volume. The argument that the Armenian Genocide is the “first genocide in the 20th century” is now less solid with the increasing acceptance that the extermination of 65,000 members of the Herero tribe by German Imperial Troops in Namibia in 1904 in fact constitutes genocide (Jan-Bart Gewald, “Imperial Germany and the Herero of Southern Africa: Genocide and the Quest for Recompense,” in *Genocide, War Crime & The West. History and Complicity* ed. Adam Jones. New York: Zed Books, 2004). In fact, on August 14, 2010 Germany admitted its historical responsibility and offered its formal apology (“Germany admits Namibia Genocide” *BBC News* (August 14, 2004). On the Web at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3565938.stm> Last access 09-20-2010).

³ The turning point of the disappearance of the Armenian Question from the international agenda is the Treaty of Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923. “The European Powers put their own seal on the Armenian question two years later by renegotiating the Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish victory and the resultant Lausanne treaties were so thorough that neither the word “Armenia” nor “Armenian” was allowed to appear anywhere in the texts. It was bitterly ironic for the Armenians that, of the several defeated Central Powers in the World War, Turkey alone expanded beyond its pre-war boundaries and this, only on the Armenian front.” Richard, G. Hovannisian, “The Republic of Armenia,” in *The*

Armenian People: From Ancient to Modern Times Volume II, Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), New York: St. Martin Press, 1997, p. 346.

- ⁴ Both concepts were framed in what Jeffrey Checkel labels as “the constructivist turn in international relations theory” in a review-article (*World Politics*, Volume 50, Number 2, 1998 [January], pp. 324-348). For the purpose of this study, both concepts are based on Alexander Wendt’s theoretical perspective of social constructivism (*Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- ⁵ While the April 24, 1965 burst of popular demonstrations in Soviet Armenia has been studied by historians like Ronald Gregory Suny (“On the Road to Independence: Cultural Cohesion and Ethnic Revival in a Multicultural Society,” in *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia* ed. Ronald Gregory Suny. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1996), it is worth mentioning that they did not go unnoticed in the Diaspora—as a testimonial article in *The Armenian Review* (Haig Sarkissian, “50th Anniversary of the Turkish Genocide as Observed in Yerevan.” *The Armenian Review* vol. 19, n. 4-76, 1966 [Winter]) among other articles confirms—in times when communications with Soviet Armenia or the outflow of objective information about events there were at least very constrained.
- ⁶ Laurence Ritter characterizes as “exteriorization” rather than “awakening” the massive mobilization and political activism of the third generation of Diaspora Armenians. Laurence Ritter, *La Longue Marche des Arméniens. Histoire et Devenir d’une Diaspora*, Paris: Robert Laffont, 2007, pp. 217-222.
- ⁷ Law 13.326 voted in the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, arguably the first international recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
- ⁸ As Varoujan Attarian (“La Mémoire en Diaspora. Actions pour la Reconnaissance du Génocide des Arméniens” in *L’Actualité du Génocide des Arméniens. Comité de Défense de la Cause Arménienne*, Paris: Edipol, 1998) explains, political activism for the recognition of the Genocide dates back to the 1920s. Nevertheless, all these efforts did not score any tangible result in the sense of reestablishing the Armenian Question on the international agenda. The mass mobilization and political activism after 1965 would eventually succeed in bringing international attention to the demand for recognition of the Genocide and reparation.
- ⁹ See among others Varoujan Attarian, *Le Génocide des Arméniens Devant l’ONU*, Paris: Éditions Complexes, 1997; Attarian, “La Mémoire en Diaspora...”
- ¹⁰ The author of this first report was the Rwandan Nicodème Rughashankiko, who had been commissioned to perform the task in 1971. He, first, included the 30th paragraph in the document he presented on March 1973, assessing the abundant documents that existed to consider the massacres of the Armenians as the first genocide of the 20th century. Later, however, and under Turkish pressure, he removed it from the report (Ara Krikorian, *Dictionnaire de la Cause Arménienne*. Paris : Edipol, 2002, pp. 185; 220).
Editorial Note: For further details see Zaven Messerlian’s article in this volume.
- ¹¹ Gérard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *Le Génocide des Arméniens*, Paris: Éditions Complexes, 1980.
- ¹² In 1970-1975, just before the emergence of the secret organizations that would use terrorist tactics for the propagation of the Armenian Cause, in total five random and individual attacks against Turkish interests and representatives were registered.
- ¹³ Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, “De 1968 à l’Islamisme Radical,” in *Histoire du Terrorisme de l’Antiquité à Al Qaida*, Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (eds.), Paris: Bayard, 2006, pp. 286-287.
- ¹⁴ For an overview and analysis of the concept see John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman, “Second Track / Citizen Diplomacy: An Overview,” in *Second Track / Citizen*

Diplomacy. Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation, John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman (eds.), New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.

- ¹⁵ The official silence which the SSR of Armenia’s government was compelled to maintain did not mean that Yerevan did not seize every opportunity that Moscow provided to promote the international recognition of the Genocide. This ‘silent diplomacy’ reflected the 1965 spirit on a more sophisticated level and in a more cautious but efficient way. It expressed itself through a number of history books criticising Turkish denial; efforts in reviving ethnic songs and cultural aspects of the Western Armenian heritage; and the construction of the Dzidzernagapert Genocide memorial as well as renaming certain local residential areas with the names of towns and cities lost to the Turkish state. These and perhaps other efforts need a detailed study on a different track which is beyond the scope of this study.
- ¹⁶ Claire Mouradian, “La Mémoire en République d’Arménie. Les Contraintes de la Politique,” in *L’Actualité du Génocide des Arméniens*, Comité de Défense de la Cause Arménienne. Paris : Edipol 1998, pp. 276-277.
- ¹⁷ A description and history of the monument can be found on the official website of the *Genocide Museum*, accessed August 20, 2010, http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/Description_and_history.php
- ¹⁸ Mouradian, p. 279.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 290-291.
- ²⁰ Considering the Whitaker Report as a turning point does not underestimate other achievements, such as Cyprus’ official recognition of the Genocide in 1982, followed by the recognition of the World Council of Churches in 1983, and especially the Permanent People’s Tribunal held in Paris on April 13-16, 1984, which, in fact, served as a basis for the Whitaker Report. My statement follows the logic of the argument formulated initially: removing the 30th paragraph in 1973 became the last stage of denial, the ultimate strike that would make the crime perfect; hence, restoring the paragraph is, considered a major turning point in the struggle for the international recognition of the Genocide.
- ²¹ Khatchik DerGhougassian (ed.), *El Derrumbe del Negacionismo. Leandro Despouy, el Informe Whitaker y el Aporte Argentino al Reconocimiento Internacional del Genocidio de los Armenios* (The Fall of Denial. Leandro Despouy, The Whitaker Report and the Argentinean Contribution to the International Recognition of the Armenian Genocide), Buenos Aires: Planeta, 2009.
- ²² Mouradian, pp. 291-292.
- ²³ Stephan H. Astourian, *From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia*, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, UC Berkeley, 2000.
- ²⁴ Gerard J. Libaridian, *The Challenge of Statehood. Armenian Political Thinking since Independence*, Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1999, p. 13.
- ²⁵ Gaïdz Minassian, *Guerre et Terrorisme Arméniens*, Paris: PUF, 2002, p. 5. Original text in French; unofficial translation of the author. The same modality will be applied to any quote, the original text of which is not English.
- ²⁶ Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,” *International Organization* 57, no. 3 (Summer, 2003), pp. 449-479.
- ²⁷ It is important at this point to understand the concept of “political” as applied to the question of the Genocide. The clash between Libaridian and Hovannisian happened during the first international conference organized by the Ter Petrosian government after independence. In that sense, it did have a political character and, therefore, tried to send a message. Yet the message, paradoxically perhaps, was that the Armenian government would not consider the issue of the Genocide on the Armenian-Turkish bilateral agenda.

Ter Petrosian's address in that same event was, political in his effort to blame the ARF-Dashnagsutiun, the main opposition party that he had outlawed barely four months earlier, for its alleged responsibility in the Genocide. The issue, therefore, was politicized on the national/internal, not the international/foreign policy agenda.

²⁸ Ankara's reluctance to normalize its relations with Armenia has another, and maybe stronger, motivation, which is still the resolution of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict respecting the so-called territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. This issue is not central to this study, despite the fact that the Turkish-Azeri strategic alliance is closely connected with Pan-Turkish identity and, therefore, there certainly is a basis to make an argument relating Genocide and Nagorno Karabagh on both the Armenian and Turkish agendas.

²⁹ As reported in *Asbarez*, "Kocharian Addresses United Nations General Assembly," September 25, 1998, accessed September 22, 2010, <http://www.asbarez.com/37731/kocharian-addresses-united-nations-general-assembly/>

³⁰ Statement by Vartan Oskanian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia at the 57th Session of the UN General Assembly General Debate, 2002, the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia*, accessed September 22, 2010, http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/speeches/020915un_ga.html.

³¹ DerGhougassian, pp. 181-199.

³² National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, the *Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia*, 2007, accessed September 22, 2010, <http://www.mil.am/eng/index.php?page=49>.

³³ In February 2002, Rivka Cohen (Koen), the Israeli Ambassador to Georgia and Armenia, answering a question about the Armenian Genocide during a press-conference in Yerevan, and said that the Holocaust is unique since it was planned and aimed to destroy the whole nation, and that nothing should be compared with the Holocaust, dissociating the Armenian Genocide from the Jewish Holocaust and questioning the fact of the genocide. She stated, "Nothing similar to the Holocaust occurred. What the Armenians went through is a tragedy, but not genocide" (Aris Ghazinyan, "Armenia-Israel: Will the New Ambassador Usher in New Stage in Armenian-Israeli Relations?" *ArmeniaNow.com*, November 1, 2010), accessed February 10, 2011, http://www.armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/25567/armenia_israel_ambassador_relations.

Cohen's statement was just a reiteration of the words of Shimon Peres, then Israeli Foreign Minister, during his official April 2001 visit to Ankara: "We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegations. Nothing similar to the Holocaust occurred. What the Armenians went through is a tragedy, but not genocide" ("Peres Denies There Was An Armenian 'Genocide'," *Rense.com*), accessed February 10, 2011, <http://www.rense.com/general21/den.htm>. Last Access February 10, 2011). Cohen's wording caused great uproar in the Armenian press. Some officials even asked the Minister Vartan Oskanyan, to declare her *persona non grata*. The Armenian Foreign Ministry sent a protest note to Israel stating that any attempt to deny or demean the reality of the Armenian Genocide was unacceptable. However, the note made no reference to declaring the Israeli Ambassador *persona non grata*. Instead, the Armenian Foreign Minister expressed confidence that the time would come for Israel to revise its policy under the pressure of the Jewish people. In response to the Armenian Foreign Ministry note, the government of Israel not only validated Cohen's remarks, but also went on to suggest that the veracity of the Genocide had yet to be confirmed through academic studies and historical research. After completing her mission as an Ambassador of her country, Cohen paid a farewell visit to Kocharian on October 4, 2004. She expressed her gratitude to the Armenian authorities for support provided during her mission; bilateral

relations were discussed; there was no report about the Armenian President mentioning anything about her controversial statement.

Two years later, a similar diplomatic scandal involved the UK Ambassador in Yerevan from 2003 to 2006, Thorhilda Mary Vivian Abbott-Watt. Citing the official position of the British government, the envoy stated that the massacres did not constitute genocide. "I think our position is well known. I know that this is a subject that is hurtful to my Armenian friends. Therefore, I really don't see the need to keep restating it. Great Britain was one of the first countries of the world to report on the events of 1915-1918, and it remains our position that we deplore the atrocities which took place and we offer our continuing sympathies to the descendants of all those people who were affected" (Harut Sassounian, "Internal Documents Reveal UK Officials Misled Parliament on Armenian Genocide," *Ardarutyun.org*, November 4, 2009), accessed February 10, 2011, <http://www.ardarutyun.org/?p=152&lang=en>. The Armenian Foreign Ministry protested the remarks in a diplomatic note sent to London, but no other measure was taken. Abbot Watt's remark provoked a strong reaction in the Diaspora; among others, on March 12, 2004 the International Group on Genocide Recognition and Prevention called the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Office (FCO), Jack Straw, to reconsider the advisability of Thorda Abbott-Watt being the UK Ambassador in Armenia. As reported by the Assembly of the Armenians of Europe, in the letter sent to the UK MFA, the chairperson of the organization, Tessa Hofmann, drew attention to the fact that Thorda Abbott-Watt repeatedly denied the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during the years 1915-16. Mentioning the words "mass killings" and "brutality" but ignoring the fact that half of the victims died during death marches or exile in desert areas from starvation, exhaustion and epidemics, Hofmann continued that Abbott-Watt was wrong in publicly doubting that the case of the Armenian Genocide did not correspond with the definition and categories of the UN Genocide Convention.

In both cases, the contradiction between a strong reaction in the Diaspora and from Armenian society and a rather mild and formal measure on behalf of the Armenian government is obvious. This contradiction reflects a lack of moral clarity with respect to any form of denial of the Genocide, and the prevalence of pragmatism and protocol behavior over commitment to principles on the exclusive issue of Genocide.

³⁴ TARC was created under the auspices of the US State Department on July 9, 2001, in Geneva, and officially ended its mission in 2004. Moorad Mooradian ("Reconciliation: A Case Study of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission," Working Paper n. 24, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, March 2004, accessed on February 20, 2011 http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_24_mooradian.pdf) analyzes the episode as "Track 2 Diplomacy." As early as December 11, 2001, obituaries were written in both the Armenian and Turkish press after the mediator, David Phillips, declared on November 19 that the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) had been asked to provide an answer to the question whether the 1915 mass killings of the Armenians constituted genocide. Apparently after agreeing on the proposal, the Turkish members of the Commission—who had been instructed not to use the word "genocide"—had a change of heart and called on the ICTJ to desist from conducting the study. The results of the TARC commission were mixed. TARC did promote a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, and some relief of the visa restrictions on Armenians, and the ICTJ study, in which it is stated that the mass killings of 1915 do legally constitute a genocide. However, it also left a series of questions unanswered about the composition of the group, how representative was it, the private interest of the participants, the State Department's true intentions, and, last but not least, the once again ambiguous position of Armenia's Foreign Ministry and the Minister's silence.

³⁵ On June 2008, during his visit to Moscow, President Serge Sarkisian declared that he was ready to negotiate with Turkey the normalization of relations without preconditions, including the discussion of past issues. Next he invited his Turkish colleague to the soccer match between the two countries in Armenia. The Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, at first did not reply to the invitation for two months, but three days before the match on September 3 accepted it. This was on the eve of the increasing likelihood that the Democratic Party US presidential candidate, Barack Obama, would recognize the Genocide, if elected. For the next six months, Armenia and Turkey conducted intensive diplomatic activity that led to the signing of a "roadmap" for the agreement on April 22, 2009, two days before the 95th commemoration of the Armenian Genocide. Armenia's Foreign Minister, Edward Nalbandian and his Turkish colleague, Ahmet Davutoglu, signed two protocols in Zurich on October 10, 2009 to start normalizing relations. The Turkish government immediately interpreted the agreement as having accomplished two of its conditions—official recognition of the borders, and the formation of a commission to study the question of the Genocide—and started to put pressure on the Armenian side to resolve the Karabagh conflict. The Armenian government, meanwhile, sent the agreement to the Constitutional Court to determine its legality. On January 12, 2010, the Armenian Constitutional Court declared that the agreement was legal, but stated that it could not submit the question of Genocide to any commission and the agreement did not refer to the question of Nagorno Karabagh. The statement provoked a strong reaction on the Turkish side, and the Prime Minister decided not to send the agreement to the legislature for ratification. On April 22, 2010, Sarkisian declared that he was "freezing" the process.

³⁶ The term refers to the policy of allowing Diaspora Armenians to return to Soviet Armenia in the aftermath of WWII. For the causes and consequences, as well as Diaspora's reaction, to this policy see (in Armenian) *The 1946-1948 Returning to the Homeland and its Lessons. Challenges for Current Trends*, Yerevan: Editorial Limush, 2009.

³⁷ Youri Levada, *L'Homme Soviétique Ordinaire*, Paris: Press de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993, p. 172.

³⁸ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, accessed January 1, 2011, <http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm>.

³⁹ For the theoretical background and its elaboration of the shock-therapy model of transition in the global context, see Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine. The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, New York: Henry Holt Books, 2007.

⁴⁰ See in particular Marshall L. Goldman, *The Privatization of Russia. Russian Reform Goes Awry*, New York: Routledge, 2003; Vadim Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002.

⁴¹ Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann, "Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2444*, September 2000, accessed January 1, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=240555.

⁴² The Conference "Opening Turkish-Armenian Borders: Social and Economic Consequences" in Yerevan on January 13-14, 2007, perhaps best illustrates how uncritical political thinking about the dominant hegemonic paradigm of liberal-democracy and free-market economy had become in Armenia. The conference was organized by the International Armenian Political Research Group and funded by USAID. The most revealing feature of the conference was the USAID conditioning of the funding of the conference; it had to exclude of political issues, especially the Genocide, from the program. The conference ended with a single sentence conclusion about an increase of up to 23 percent of Armenia's GDP if the borders were opened.

⁴³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Teoría de Política Internacional*, Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1988.

⁴⁴ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Poder e Interdependencia: La Política Mundial en Transición*, Buenos Aires: GEL, 1988.

⁴⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Fionna B. Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou, "Remapping the Boundaries of 'State' and 'National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 4 (2007).

⁴⁶ I am grateful to my former student and assistant at Universidad de San Andrés, Martín Cataife, whose graduation thesis under my supervision was about Israel's National Security Strategy, for his help in the elaboration of the part of the paper that deals with the Holocaust in Israel's National Security Doctrine.

⁴⁷ Michael Handel, "The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for Absolute Security," in *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, Murray Williamson, Knox MacGregor, and Alvin Bernstein (eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 542.

⁴⁸ Gil Merom, "Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism," *Political Science Quarterly* 114, no. 3 (Fall 1999).

⁴⁹ Idith Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 98.

⁵⁰ Sasson Sofer, "Towards Distant Frontiers: The Course of Israeli Diplomacy," in *Israel: The First Hundred Years, Volume IV: Israel in the International Arena*, Efraim Karsh (ed.), Portland Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004, p. 4.

⁵¹ For a brief review of Argentina's foreign policy in a historical perspective, see José Paradiso, *Debates y Trayectoria de la Política Exterior Argentina* (Debates and Trajectories of Argentina's Foreign Policy), Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1993; for a conceptual debate see Francisco Corigliano, "Política Exterior Argentina 1973-2008: Debates Teóricos" ("Argentinean Foreign Policy 1973-2008: Theoretical Debates") *Criterio* no. 2336 (April 2008), pp. 175-179; and for the impact of internal factors on the making of foreign policy see Roberto Russell, "Sistemas de Creencias y Política Exterior Argentina: 1976-1989," ("Belief Systems and Argentinean Foreign Policy") *Serie de Documentos e Informes de Investigación N° 204, de FLACSO / Argentina*. Buenos Aires, July 1996.

⁵² Kathryn Sikkink, "From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights" *Latin American Politics and Society* 50, issue 1, (Spring 2008), pp. 1-29.

⁵³ Gloria Y. Park, "Truth as Justice. Legal and Extralegal Development of the Right to Truth," *Harvard International Review* (Winter 2010), pp. 24-27.

⁵⁴ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-46.

⁵⁵ The concept of "complementarity" is practically the only effort to define Armenia's foreign policy since Independence. Vartan Oskanian (*Speaking to be Heard: A Decade of Speeches*, Yerevan: Civiltas Foundation, 2008) elaborated it in a series of speeches, including "Complementarity at Work," NATO EAPC, Budapest (May 30, 2001); "Policy of Complementarity: A Choice and a Burden" at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London (April 21, 2004).

**ՀԱՅՈՑ ԾԵՂԱՊԱՆՈՒԹԻՒՆԸ ՄԻՋԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ՕՐԱԿԱՐԳԻ ՎՐԱՑ.
ԴԻԻԱՆԱԳԻՏԱԿԱՆ ՍՏԱՆՁՆՈՒՄԻ ՀԱՐԾԸ
(Ամփոփում)**

ԽԱՉԻԿ ՏԷՐ ՂՈՒԿԱՍԵԱՆ
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Ուսումնասիրությունը կը վերլուծէ Հայոց Յեղասպանության հարցին յառաջացումը՝ իբրև միջազգային օրակարգի քաղաքական խնդիր: Ան լուսարձակի տակ կ'առնէ կառուցային պայմաններն ու տարբեր դերակատարներուն նպաստը՝ պետական եւ ոչ-պետական ոլորտներուն, ուր ձեւաւորուած են ճանաչման, հատուցման եւ հաշտութեան պահանջները: Ուսումնասիրութեան առաջնային վարկածը կը հաւաստէ, որ Յեղասպանութեան հարցին միջազգային օրակարգ բերուիլը նախ արդիւնքն էր եւ Սփիւռքի եւ Խորհրդային Հայաստանի մէջ ազգային ինքնութեան պահպանութեան նկատառումներու: Այդուհանդերձ, Հայաստանի անկախացումէն (1991) ետք, իբրև պետական քաղաքականութիւն, ան վերածուեցաւ խնդրայարոյց հիմնահարցի: Ուսումնասիրութիւնը կը քննարկէ Յեղասպանութեան խնդրին հոլովոյթը՝ անկախութենէն ասդին, կ'ընդգծէ հարցին ռազմավարական եւ բարոյական երեսակները եւ անոնց հակասութիւնները վերացնելու մարտահրաւէրները, հուսկ՝ կը նպատակադրէ ապացուցել որ հարցին դիւանագիտական ստանձնումը՝ իբրև պետական քաղաքականութեան ուղեգիծ, անհրաժեշտութիւն է, եւ կրնայ բանաձեւուիլ իբրև Հայաստանի Հանրապետութեան պետական քաղաքականութեան եւ Սփիւռքի քաղաքացիական զօրաշարժի փոխ-լրացման տեսութիւն մը: